Abstract -
INTRODUCTION

D
uring the 1980s and 1990s, Congress and the states realigned programs for low-income families, which placed greater emphasis on work as a means of raising their standard of living. Central to federal and state efforts was the transformation of the welfare program Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) into Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and expansions to state and federal earned income credits. In turn, researchers evaluated these program innovations and correlated expansions of federal and state earned income credits to lower welfare caseloads and higher employment rates among single mothers.
The rewards and consequences of an emphasis on work are still under scrutiny as researchers more completely characterize the sometimes successful, sometimes troublesome transitions of individuals off of welfare. An evaluation of programs affecting such transitions depends partly upon who is intended to benefi t from the program, which may be unclear or may include several intended pools of benefi ciaries. Nonetheless, appropriate measures of program utilization hinge on choosing the pool of benefi ciaries that comport with the perceived goals of the policy. In this paper, we examine two pools-all current and former welfare recipients regardless of their earned income credit eligibility, and the subset of only
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those eligible for the credit. If policymakers want to know the extent to which the earned income credit earnings incentive reaches all current and former welfare recipients in any one year, then the relevant pool is the fi rst one. On the other hand, if policymakers want to know the extent to which the earned income credit reaches those eligible for the credit, then the relevant pool is the subset of the fi rst pool that includes only those households with earnings within the earned income credit eligibility range. Ultimately, the measures of utilization associated with the two pools may have substantively different policy implications. For example, to raise utilization among all current and former welfare recipients, policymakers may consider alleviating barriers to work. To raise utilization among the subset of current and former welfare recipients with earnings eligible for the earned income credit, policymakers may consider outreach efforts. To facilitate our discussion on utilization, we define two measures: (1) the receipt percentage, which is the percentage of all current and former welfare recipients that receive the state earned income credit in a given year regardless of eligibility for the credit, and (2) the participation percentage, which is the percentage of current and former welfare recipients who receive the credit among only those eligible for the credit. In this paper, we report results on the utilization of the credit in three parts: (1) an investigation of the household characteristics that determine receipt and participation in the state earned income credit program among current and former welfare recipients, (2) an analysis of the number of years current and former welfare recipients spend before taking up the credit and the number of years current and former welfare recipients receive the credit, and (3) an examination of whether current and former welfare recipients respond to changes in earned income credit programs. The fi rst issue addresses the fact that policymakers may not only care whether those eligible to participate in the earned income credit do so, they may also want to know the extent to which all current and former welfare recipients use earned income credits as they transition away from welfare, especially given the current policy emphasis on work incentives. The second issue recognizes that receipt and participation percentages are snapshots of a dynamic process as parents pass through a window of eligibility for the credit. The third issue addresses the fact that not only will having earnings within the eligibility window affect receipt and participation, the amount of the benefi t received, determined by the parameters of the earned income credit, may matter.
We examine these measures with administrative data on Minnesota's earned income credit program, the Working Family Credit (WFC), which includes information on household heads receiving welfare, receipt of the earned income credit, and earnings covered under the unemployment insurance (UI) system. The sample includes all households fi rst observed on welfare from 1992-1999, with an additional observation for each year afterward. As discussed later, some children will become too old to be eligible for welfare or the EIC, which implies that the "parents" in our sample sometimes include households that claim zero qualifying dependents for the state earned income credit. Our household-level data include over one million observations, capturing the wide range of circumstances that face current and former Minnesota welfare recipients. Although we examine a state earned income credit, readers may fi nd our analysis relevant to the federal earned income credit, although effects on utilization of state credits will differ from those at the federal level since migration across states affects only state credits.
To summarize our results, we fi nd that participation percentages for current and former welfare recipients are lower than the participation percentages for all taxpayers under the federal EIC, which may be partly due to a higher concentration of lower earnings among current welfare recipients. In turn, receipt percentages are substantially lower than participation percentages for all current and former welfare recipients, which is in part due to the number of ineligible parents who have moved out of the state, have no earnings or have too much in earnings. In any given year, 40 percent or less of current and former welfare households in our dataset receive the state earned income credit. However, a large proportion of parents that successfully transition from welfare to work eventually participate in the earned income credit, which implies state funding is transferred from welfare to tax credits. Examining such welfare transitions reveals that some former recipients eventually find themselves with earnings too high to be eligible for the earned income credit. Those less likely to transition quickly from welfare to earned income credits and to income levels above the earned income credit eligibility limits are non-whites, younger parents, and those without a high school diploma, factors that may be related to barriers to work. Further examination finds that expansions to state earned income credits may have raised credit utilization rates, effectively reaching more welfare recipients and providing further incentives to work. However, even with a large micro-level dataset, the results are less than perfectly robust.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Researchers fi nd that state and federal earned income credits may contribute to a greater likelihood that parents will transition from welfare to work. Some fi nd that increases in federal and state earned income credits increase the employment rate of single mothers (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Rosenbaum, 2000 and Ellwood, 2000; Blank and Schmidt, 2001) .
1 Grogger (2003) fi nds that more generous earned income credits contributed to lower welfare caseloads in the 1990s. Using data from 1986 -1995 , Neumark and Wascher (2001 report a positive correlation between higher earned income credits and the proportion of parents with incomes above the poverty guidelines.
Research on the impact of earned income credits on employment rates and welfare caseloads raises the question of how many welfare recipients get earned income credits. With respect to the receipt percentage, Stinson (2007a, 2007b) and Hotz and Scholz (2003) use administrative data from Minnesota and California and fi nd that between 20-55 percent of welfare recipients received state or federal earned income credits between 1992-1999, with higher receipt percentages in later years. In this analysis, we examine all current and former welfare recipients because some may never use the earned income credit but rely on their welfare grant, child support, other income, and in-kind assistance. Because earned income credits extend benefits to those who transition from welfare to work, we contribute to the literature by examining receipt rates after parents transition away from welfare.
Several researchers have examined the participation percentage for the entire eligible population; Scholz (1994) Researchers generally fi nd that public assistance recipients participate at lower rates than those for the larger eligible population reported in the previous paragraph. Hill et al. (1999) match a weighted sample of California welfare recipients with federal income tax records for the years 1993 and 1994 and fi nd that between 42-54 percent of single parents in California on AFDC and eligible for the federal earned income credit actually receive it. For married parents, they estimate between 61-84 percent of AFDC parents participate in the credit. SB/SE Research (2002) also report lower participation percentages of approximately 65 percent for public assistance recipients and 71 percent for food stamp recipients, where they defined participation as eligible recipients who fi le an income tax return. Scholz (1994) includes a number of demographic and institutional characteristics in a regression analysis of participation rates and fi nds that taxpayers on public assistance are less likely to receive the federal earned income credit. Also, taxpayers who receive Social Security, who have larger families, who are unmarried, who are of Hispanic origin, who have a smaller earned income credit, or who live in states without a state income tax are less likely to receive the credit.
Our research adds to the literature by more completely characterizing: (1) the difference between receipt and participation rates, (2) parents' transitions from welfare to earned income credits or other outcome paths, and (3) whether expansions in earned income credit parameters raise the probability of receipt and participation.
MINNESOTA'S EARNED INCOME CREDIT AND OTHER RELATED WELFARE POLICIES
In the transition from welfare to work, federal and state earned income credits provide additional assistance after parents become earnings ineligible for TANF. Grant amounts for TANF vary by state and sometimes by sub-state region; for example, in 2003, the median annualized earnings at which a single parent with two children became ineligible for TANF was $11,328 in Minnesota's program, while the highest level was $23,196 in Alaska's program. In comparison, parents ineligible for TANF could still receive the federal and state earned income credit with earnings up to $34,692 (United States House of Representatives, 2004) . For a single parent with two children, Figure  1 depicts the amounts for Minnesota's TANF grant (the Minnesota Family Investment Program-MFIP), the federal earned income credit (EIC), and the Minnesota earned income credit (the Working Family Credit-WFC). Annualized amounts of benefi ts and credits are on the y-axis and annual earnings are on the x-axis. Since MFIP combines the TANF cash grant with food stamps, we graph the cash portion and add the cash value of food stamps.
To receive state or federal earned income credits, taxpayers must fi le an income tax return. In all states other than Minnesota, the state earned income credit is a percentage of the federal earned income credit, which phases in with earnings until it reaches a maximum or plateau, and phases out until the credit equals zero (Figure 1 ) (Johnson and Lazere, 1998) . Minnesota authorized a single-tier credit until 1998 when legislators enacted the current two-tier credit. As shown in Figure 2 , the credit phases in until it reaches the fi rst-tier maximum, remains constant until earnings reach the phase-in to the second tier, phases in to the second maximum, remains constant until earnings or income reach the phase-out fl oor, and then phases out.
To further set the context of the policy environment in which expansions in Minnesota's WFC took place, we summarize all Minnesota and federal legislative enactments relevant to low-income families:
(1) Federal Earned Income Credit, 1991 Credit, -1997 reduced after-tax, after-benefit income (Hirasuna and Manzi, 1997) . This was caused by a combination of increased federal and state income taxes, a decreased federal earned income credit, a decreased WFC, and decreased welfare benefi ts ( Figure  1 ). In Minnesota's two-tier credit, the second or upper tier increased the WFC as the federal earned income credit began to phase out, eliminating the interval of decreased income (Wilson, 2000 
CALCULATION OF MINNESOTA'S WORKING FAMILY CREDIT
To calculate the amount of the WFC, the fi ve rows in equation [1] below correspond to the fi ve stages of the credit: (1) the phase-in to the fi rst tier, (2) the maximum credit for the fi rst tier, (3) the phase-in to the second tier, (4) the maximum credit for the second tier, and (5) the phase-out. where w equals earnings, RATE1 is the phase-in rate to the fi rst tier, MAX is the maximum fi rst-tier credit, WFCFLOOR is the phase-in fl oor to the second tier, RATE2 is the phase-in to the second tier, MAX2 is the maximum credit for the second tier, PHOUTF, is the phase-out fl oor, and PHOUTRT is the rate at which the credit phases out.
DATA
To analyze WFC receipt and participation rates, we merged several administrative datasets. With data from the Minnesota Department of Human Services containing records of every adult with children on AFDC or TANF/MFIP from January 1992 through December 1999, we aggregated adults into households using a case number provided by the Department of Human Services, assigned a household head, and matched state income tax records of Minnesota residents using Social Security numbers for the same years with data from the Minnesota Department of Revenue. 4 With the income tax data, we merged variables on whether or not the household head or spouse filed an income tax return, or received Minnesota's earned income credit. 5 We next took quarterly data on job earnings for 1995-1999 reported in the wage detail fi le from the Minnesota Department of Economic Security (DES), which was called "covered earnings." We matched the earnings information using Social Security numbers for the household head and the spouse listed on his or her tax return. 6 Because an individual may hold multiple jobs over multiple quarters, we aggregated the data over all job holdings by year and Social Security number, which gave us annual earnings. We then matched the data by year and household head and then by year and spouse listed on income tax returns. We did not match by earnings of spouses listed in the [ ]
AFDC/TANF fi le, since some parents may divorce or marry before the end of the tax year. For the same reason, we matched income tax records to the welfare data twice, fi rst to the household head using the Social Security number of the tax fi ler and then using the Social Security number of the fi ler's spouse.
Also, we added data on the percentage change in aggregate wages within the local labor market area, calculated from summary data on jobs covered under the state unemployment insurance program . 7 The wage data act as a proxy for annual changes in wages and job opportunities. Higher aggregate wages are expected to increase the probability that parents on welfare would either fi nd a job or receive a pay increase suffi ciently large to make them eligible for the earned income credit.
We kept separate records for each household for each year after the fi rst year the household received welfare. 8 For example, if a family was fi rst recorded on welfare in 1994, we kept separate records and time varying covariates for that household for 1994 and for each subsequent year through 1999. The data fi le contained a total of 1,098,473 household-year observations. Since the number of households in any year equaled the number of households in the prior year plus the number of new welfare households, the number of observations in a year increased over time.
In constructing the data, we had several options for a starting date. Since Minnesota income tax records were available from 1992-1999, we could have constructed the data to include all households from 1992 forward, but that would have included households whose heads were younger than age 13 when they fi rst entered the data set and were not ready to work. Also, we considered including households with heads age 14 or older, but we did not have any record of whether they were within the state. Ultimately, we chose to track households from the fi rst year we observe them on AFDC or TANF/MFIP, which means we know they are within the state; this approach better comported with our research issue of examining how many parents utilize earned income credits while on welfare and after they transition away from welfare. The data on AFDC and TANF/ MFIP recipients include the date of birth of the children and the number of children on AFDC and TANF/MFIP. We do not have data on the number of children in the household when parents are not on welfare. For that reason, when a child reaches age 19, that child was no longer counted as part of the household and the number of children was reduced by one. If there were no children under 19, then the number of children was set to zero. Also, setting the age limit at 19 further comported with AFDC and TANF/MFIP statutes regarding the age limit of eligibility for children.
County of residence was recorded while families received welfare and if they fi led a tax return, but since a signifi cant proportion of parents did not fi le a return after they left welfare, it was impossible to verify where they lived. 9 For those individuals, we attached data on changes in wages in the local labor market based upon their most recently recorded residence, which may have slightly biased the information on local labor markets. We also examined separate regressions with statewide changes in aggregate wages; however, since there were no appreciable differences, those results are not reported.
We constructed two datasets-the fi rst included every household that received welfare for at least one month from 1992 through December 1999, and the second had the same data merged with covered earnings from 1995-1999. Both datasets included time varying covariates and year-by-year recordings of WFC utilization. By keeping all households in the sample, the data included more years of information since their fi rst recording of welfare receipt, which allowed for a more complete analysis of WFC utilization while parents transitioned off of welfare.
In order to examine participation, we estimated eligibility for the WFC with the number of children last reported while on welfare less any children who have become too old to be claimed as qualifying dependents, and with covered earnings below the income eligibility limits for the earned income credit. This of course imperfectly estimated eligibility because the number of children may have differed from qualifying children because of the rules regarding the determination of a qualifying child, and parents may have given birth after leaving welfare. Also, covered earnings excluded self-employment earnings and other earnings not covered under the state UI system.
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RECEIPT AND PARTICIPATION RATES
As expected, the receipt percentages for the Minnesota earned income credit among all current and former welfare recipients are lower than the participation percentages among those who are eligible. Table 1 lists the magnitudes of the differ- ences between the two measures. From 1992-1999, current and former parents' receipt percentages range from 31.2-40.0 percent, whereas from 1995-1999, participation percentages range from 62.9-65.0 percent. Mechanically, the difference between these percentages is that receipt percentages include parents ineligible because they are without earnings and parents ineligible because their earnings are too high. These percentages are somewhat surprising in that even though earned income credits have been found to contribute to higher labor force participation rates and lower welfare caseloads, current and former welfare recipients participate in the state credit at lower rates than national statistics for all individuals eligible for the earned income credit. Besides participation, a somewhat surprising result is that a sizably smaller percentage of all current and former welfare recipients receive the state earned income credit, regardless of eligibility. The results help place bounds on the extent of the benefits delivered to current and former welfare recipients in any single year in that participation and receipt rates may be lower than expectations. However, we describe below conditions under which participation rates might be higher across different demographic groups, earnings levels, and time since fi rst entering welfare.
In Tables 2 and 3 , we further characterize utilization rates by placing parents along earnings categories and segments of the state earned income credit-no covered earnings, earnings by segment of the state earned income credit, and covered earnings that are too high. Table 2 lists the percentages of all households within each category, and Table 3 lists the percentages of parents that receive the credit. From Table 2 , depending on the year, 33.1-39.3 percent of households have no covered earnings and 5.9-13.5 percent have covered earnings that are too high, which leaves between 53.0-55.3 percent with covered earnings that meet the eligibility requirements for the earned income credit. Similar to Liebman's (1998) analysis of the federal earned income credit, parents increasingly participate at higher levels of covered earnings, and at the upper segments of the earned income credit.
10 From Table 3 , between 52.1-55.4 percent of parents with covered earnings in the phase-in range and 76.2-77.9 percent of parents with covered earnings in the maximum credit range participate in the state earned Two-Tier Credit income credit. 11 Although segmented by phase of the credit, participation percentages appear to vary continuously across covered earnings ranges with the highest percentages between 75-80 percent, which are similar to national averages for the federal earned income credit when considering all households regardless of welfare history (Figure 3) . The lower overall participation by current and former welfare recipients may in part relate to a concentration of households at lower earnings levels. Approximately 24.1-31.9 percent of current and former welfare recipients are concentrated within the phase-in segment of the credit (Table 2) .
To further characterize the differences between and within receipt and participation, we report the distribution of households by demographic characteristic and phase of the WFC in Table 4 , and the participation percentages by demographic characteristic and earnings-related segment of the state earned income credit for 1999 in Table 5. 12 From Table 4 , parents who are non-white, without a high school diploma, age 40 or more, or under age 20 are most likely to have no covered earnings or earnings in the phase-in range of the credit, which are groups that have been identifi ed as more likely to face work barriers (Danziger et al., 2000; Turner et al., 2006) . Table 5 indicates that these parents often participate in the earned income credit at lower rates when their covered earnings are in the phase-in range of the credit.
Blank (2007) identifi es and characterizes former welfare parents who disappear from administrative records, with no record of earnings, welfare, income taxes, or other public assistance programs. We fi nd that from 1995-1999, the percentage of parents without any record of covered , 1995-1999 11 A small percentage of households with no covered earnings still receive the WFC, which might indicate self employment income, and a small percentage of households with earnings too high to receive the EIC also receive the WFC, which might result from a variety of reasons such as unknown changes in the number of qualifying children and potential noncompliance. For all households, approximately 3 percent in 1999 had no covered earnings but received the credit, and approximately 1 percent of households appeared to have covered earnings that are too high to be eligible for the credit but still received it. 12 We select one year instead of reporting all years because we fi nd that the percentages are fairly stable across time; using data for a single year also avoids double counting of households and the effects of year-to-year changes in the state earned income credit. Finally, we report whether receipt and participation rates differ between current and former welfare recipients (Table 6) . If a signifi cant number of parents leave welfare for work, then receipt and participation rates may increase after parents leave welfare. Although parents who leave welfare initially receive the state earned income credit at higher rates than after leaving welfare, receipt and participation percentages among former welfare recipients decrease over time. The percentage of households that left welfare and received the state earned income credit decreases from 38.2 percent in 1992 to 31.7 percent in 1999, whereas the percentage of current welfare recipients that receive the credit increases from 31.2-54.3 percent. The percentage of eligible households that left welfare who participated in the state earned income credit also decreases from 66.1 percent in 1995 to 62.1 percent in 1999, whereas the participation rate among current welfare recipients increases from 60.8-68.2 percent. At least some of the declining rates may be due to out-migration of former welfare recipients. Also, a separate analysis confi rms that as households approach the earnings eligibility limit, they may have unearned income that renders them ineligible for the state earned income credit. However, some of these households may survive on income and in-kind income from family, partners, friends, and nonprofits even though they may be eligible for welfare (Blank, 2007) . Increasing utilization rates among current welfare recipients may relate to a number of factors, including higher levels of the state earned income credit, higher earnings among current welfare recipients because of changes in welfare policy, higher earnings because of a better economy, and changes in the characteristics of new welfare entrants (Topel, 2001 ).
THE TIMING OF WELFARE AND STATE EARNED INCOME CREDIT UTILIZATION
The previous analysis underscores the fact that receipt and participation rates are part of a dynamic process that partly depends upon the rates at which parents increase their earnings, which determines their eligibility for welfare and earned income credits. Although covered earnings may generally increase from year to year, the rate of increase may systematically differ across different demographic groups of parents. In this section, we report information on the dynamics of earned income credit utilization, with statistics on the time until fi rst receipt of the state earned income credit and on transitions in eligibility from welfare to the state earned income credit.
In Figure 4 , we report Kaplan-Meier statistics on the time to fi rst use of the state earned income credit along with the time before parents exit their fi rst observed spell on welfare. Because earned income credit receipt may depend upon the level of generosity of the credit, we select only 13 Upon request, the authors can provide a table of these demographic characteristics. households fi rst observed on welfare in 1992 and track their survival probability across subsequent years. 14 A household's estimated probability of staying on their fi rst observed spell on welfare drops from 0.4 in the fi rst year to 0.2 in the third year. As households transition from welfare, they are more likely to have received the state earned income credit at least one time-the probability increases from 0.35 in the fi rst year to 0.5 in the third year.
A minority of parents in the sample receive the credit in any given year, but their survival estimates suggest that eventually roughly 75 percent of parents will receive the state earned income credit. Although the difference is typically one year, household heads who are more likely to have the longest stays in their fi rst welfare spell in comparison to all other groups are African Americans, Asian Americans, parents under 20, males and parents with children fi ve years old and younger. These same groups, along with American Indians and parents without a high school diploma, take the longest time to receive their fi rst state earned income credit, where time before fi rst receipt of the earned income credit varies by as much as six years.
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Utilization of state earned income credits appears temporary. In Tables 7  and 8 , we tabulate the number of years a parent receives the WFC, the distribution of covered earnings, and other related characteristics for parents who were on welfare in 1992. Summing across the rows in Table 7 , for each year 1992-1999, 50 percent or more of parents receive the credit for three years or less. As time passes, increasing percentages of parents use the credit multiple times, but only 5.8 percent of households receive the credit for all eight years.
As mentioned earlier, utilization rates that are less than 100 percent may refl ect 14 To capture an entire spell, we drop households observed on welfare in the fi rst month of the dataset (January 1992). Spell endings occur when the household does not receive welfare for one or more months. The Minnesota Department of Human Services helps assure that the spell endings are accurate by checking the data after receiving records of ineligibility. We estimate the probability of exiting welfare with the Kaplan-Meier technique with units in years. Because we select only 1992 entrants, each unit represents a year such that a spell ending in one year implies the household left welfare sometime within the fi rst year in 1992. 15 A table of these survival estimates is available upon request. a number of factors, including migration away from the state, reliance on income other than earnings, too little in earnings to substantively benefi t from the state earned income credit, and earnings that are too high to qualify for the credit. As reported in Table 8 , less than 35 percent of parents have any covered earnings and 10 percent have covered earnings less than $2,000 even in 1999, seven years after they were fi rst observed on welfare. However, as shown in Table 8 , the percentage of parents with covered earnings too high to remain eligible for the state earned income credit increases over time, with 10 percent of households with earnings exceeding $46,000 by 1999.
The fi ndings of relatively low yearto-year receipt percentages and the estimates that parents in the sample often eventually receive the credit suggest a somewhat chaotic path from welfare to receipt of the state earned income credit. In Tables 9 and 10, we classify parents into different status categories based upon whether they receive welfare, whether they receive the earned income credit and whether they have covered earnings. In Table 9 , we place the status categories for parents in 1998 along the rows and their transition to each status in 1999 along the columns. For each entry in the resultant matrix, we report the probability a parent transitions from status i in 1998 to status j in 1999, where the reported probability is the proportion of parents who began in status i that end in status j. The table allows us to track transitions across sev- (Tables 1  and 8 ). For Table 10 , we conduct a thought experiment by projecting transitions over a fi ve year period by sequentially multiplying the probability of transitioning from status i to j.
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Approximately 58 percent of parents on welfare with no covered earnings and no WFC in 1998 remain in the same status in 1999. However, if the transition probabilities remain stable, parents who start out on welfare without any covered earnings or the WFC are more likely to receive the WFC fi ve years later than they are to be in the same status of welfare receipt with no covered earnings and no WFC. A small percentage of parents eventually have earnings levels too high to be eligible for the WFC, with the highest probabilities from those who were off of welfare, had covered earnings but did not receive the WFC, or had covered earnings that are initially too high.
Ultimately, some parents may end up worse off than in 1998. For example, as can be seen in the bottom row of Table 10 , of those with covered earnings too high to receive the WFC in 1998, 20 percent are projected to be back on welfare with covered earnings and the WFC. Scanning across the rows in the column titled "No Record" within Perhaps the number of parents who receive benefi ts from only some of the programs for which they are eligible provide an early indicator of parents who may not participate in welfare and earned income credit programs in future years. In any case, the projections are rough estimates using summary statistics that do not control for changes in policy, demographic characteristics or economic conditions. More research is needed to place more accurate bounds on these transitions.
PARENTS' RESPONSES TO CHANGES IN THE WFC
Policymakers may be able to affect utilization rates by changing the parameters of the credit (Equation 1 and Figure 2) . Using a logit regression, we run two sets of regressions to estimate separately the probability of receipt and the probability of participation, with the independent variables for both regressions including the state earned income credit parameters, other policy variables, demographic characteristics and characteristics of the economic environment. Since the results regarding demographic and economic characteristics may further inform policymakers, we summarize the estimated coeffi cients on these variables in our results.
We report the results from both receipt and participation regressions because the impact of state earned income credit parameters and other variables that are in the regressions may be different across the two measures. A parent's choice to receive the earned income credit depends on choices regarding whether to participate in the labor force and how much to earn, whereas the parent's choice to participate in the earned income credit program is conditional on already being in the labor force and having earnings that satisfy eligibility requirements.
We hypothesize that adjustments to the state earned income credit parameters that increase its generosity would increase utilization rates, as households may be more likely to spend the time needed to fi le or to pay a tax preparer to help them fi le and claim the credit. Also, households may be more likely to hear about the credit from neighbors and others if the credit is more generous.
Our results confi rm this hypothesis. We report the results of several regressions to determine the robustness of these results. First, we measure the effect of WFC parameters on the probability of receipt of the maximum credit. Second, because many previous studies include one or a subset of earned income credit parameters, we include all parameters to see if household heads respond to all individual WFC parameters (Neumark and Wascher, 2001; Grogger, 2003) . Since Minnesota adopted a two-tier credit, we can take advantage of additional parameters that other states and the federal government do not have and, in combination with a large micro dataset, we may fi nd different results from previous studies. Third, to reduce specifi cation bias, we account for changes in other policies that may correlate with changes in the WFC. In one approach, we include dummy variables for each year. However, since yearly dummies can incorporate the impact of the WFC itself, we also report regression results without these dummies except for when our search identifi ed other relevant policy changes, including the state implementation of its welfare reform program and reforms to child support in 1998 and the lowering of tax rates in all income brackets in 1999.
The WFC parameters used in the regressions incorporate all state changes in the generosity of the credit, including those related to changes in the federal credit. For example, the calculation of the maximum credit takes into account federal expansions to the credit through the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Acts and the fact that before 1998 the WFC was a percentage of the federal EIC, the state expansion of the credit from 10-15 percent in 1993, and the state expansions that accompanied the switch to a two-tier credit. In addition, the state adjusts the parameters of the credit to refl ect expectations of infl ation. 17 To incorporate the change from a one-tier to a two-tier credit, in years prior to 1998, we set WFCFLOOR equal to zero, MAX2 equal to the maximum credit, RATE2 equal to RATE1, MAX1 equal to zero, and all remaining rate parameters equal to 0.00001. 18 This specifi cation preserves the piecewise linear construction of the WFC and allows us to examine effects along different segments of the credit.
Another source of variation that may help capture the effects of the state earned income credit is differences in the number of children across households. Minnesota's earned income credit follows the federal credit in allowing different amounts for parents with zero, one, or two or more dependents. Since this variation changes the values of any given WFC parameter from one household to the next, it may 17 The federal EIC is indexed for infl ation. To allow comparisons of the real value of the state earned income credit across years, we adjust the maximum credits, phase-in and phase-out fl oors for realized infl ation using the CPI for Minneapolis-St. Paul. This may result in slight inaccuracies in that some local areas in Minnesota may have a different rate of infl ation than that experienced in Minneapolis-St. Paul. 18 Also, since the WFC remained a one-tier credit for households without dependents, we kept the same specifi cation for all years to 1998 and set the phase-out rate equal to 0.00001.
help capture some of the effects of the various state earned income credit parameters on the probability of utilization. To partly account for decreasing receipt and participation rates over time, we include fi xed effects for border counties and an interaction term with the years since the household was last on welfare. We expect that over time the households most likely to migrate out of the state are in border counties, especially as the number of years since last on welfare increases. To identify evidence of out-migration, we compare these results to the estimated coeffi cient for the time that parents were last on welfare within interior counties.
We use separate datasets for receipt and participation behavior. For receipt behavior, we take advantage of having more years of information by using the 1992-1999 dataset. For participation, we can only use the 1995-1999 dataset. We estimate the probability of receipt or participation with a reduced form expression where receipt depends upon the sum of WFC parameters, demographic characteristics and environmental economic characteristics.
19 Maximum credits, phase-in fl oors to the second tier, and phase-out floor of the WFC are adjusted to 2002 dollars. The phase-in and phase-out rates are unadjusted, making cross-year comparisons possible with real wages and parameters implicitly determining the credit amount in real dollars. 20 We list the probability regression results in Tables 11 and 12 with standard errors that are adjusted for clustered sampling with respect to local labor market areas. By virtue of the logit function, one can transform the estimated coeffi cients to represent the effect of a one-unit change in the independent variables on the odds ratio of receipt, where the odds ratio equals π/(1 -π) and π equals the probability of receipt. The exponent of each estimated coeffi cient yields an estimate of the percentage change in the odds ratio. If the independent variable correlates to an increase in the probability of utilization, the exponent of the estimated coeffi cient will be greater than one, (β > 1) and the percentage change in odds due to a one unit increase in the independent variable equals 100 times the quantity of the exponent of the estimated coeffi cient minus one [100*(β -1)]. If there is no change in odds due to a one unit increase in the independent variable, then the exponent of the coeffi cient equals one (β = 1). If the independent variable leads to a decrease in the probability of utilization, the estimated coefficient will be greater than zero, but less than one, (0 < β < 1) and the percentage change in odds equals the exponent of the estimated coeffi cient minus one [100*(β -1)].
Changes in the Probability of Receipt
In Table 11 , we provide the estimated regression coeffi cients on the probability of receipt, where columns (1) and (2) include only the maximum credit and columns (3) and (4) include all of Minnesota's earned income credit parameters. Also, columns (1) and (3) include all year effects, while columns (2) and (4) include year effects only for the1998 implementation of TANF/MFIP and other reforms and the 1999 reduction in income taxes. The fi rst row of Table 11 corresponds to the Maximum Working Family Credit and shows under columns (1) and (2) that a $100-increase in the maximum credit raises the odds of household receipt of the credit by 5 percent regardless of whether all year effects are included in the regression. We obtain mixed results in the model with all WFC parameters, with some indications that households respond to individual parameters. Perhaps not surprisingly, including all year effects results in few statistically signifi cant coeffi cients. In the regression with all current and former welfare recipients, the only statistically signifi cant WFC coeffi cient implies that an increase in the phase-in rate to the second tier reduces the probability of receipt.
The desirability of including year effects is not entirely clear. By including year effects, we are more likely to capture the effects of any remaining policy changes to low-income families, the results uniformly suggest an expansion to the WFC raises the probability of receipt. First, a 1 percent higher phase-in rate for the fi rst tier gives some households more income and raises the odds of receipt by 9 percent. Second, a $100 increase in the maximum fi rst-tier credit raises the odds of receipt by 14 percent. Third, a $1,000 higher earnings threshold before phasing into the second tier forestalls an increase in the WFC, which lowers the odds of receipt by 6 percent. Fourth, a higher second-tier maximum credit raises the odds of receipt and suggests that regardless of whether a single-tier or two-tier credit is created, expanding the generosity of the credit raises the odds of receipt. Fifth, a $1,000 higher earnings threshold before the WFC phases out allows higher incomes for some parents and raises receipt odds by 1.9 percent. Finally, a 1 percent higher phase-out rate would lower the credit amount for some households and lower the odds of receipt by 17 percent. The estimated coefficient for the phase-in rate to the second tier is the only estimate that is not statistically signifi cant, with a p-value of 0.09, and suggests that a 1 percent increase in the rate results in a 0.9 percent increase in the odds of receipt. Parents on the pre-TANF program, AFDC, are less likely to receive the WFC in comparison to parents on TANF/MFIP and parents who left welfare. Parents on TANF/MFIP may be more likely to receive the WFC in comparison to parents on AFDC because the income eligibility limit for TANF/MFIP is higher after including the food portion of the grant and due to the requirement that caseworkers must inform TANF/MFIP recipients of the WFC.
We test for evidence of out-migration with fi xed effects for border counties and an interaction term between border counties and years since last on welfare. We hypothesize that out-migration increases with years after leaving welfare, and the results corroborate that hypothesis with households along the border counties more likely to receive the WFC while on welfare, but up to 16 percent less likely each year after their last welfare episode. These out-migration effects are in addition to the general trend that households are less likely to receive the WFC as years elapse since their last time on welfare. As noted above, in addition to migrating out of the state, parents may increasingly garner too much in earnings or income to be eligible for the WFC, or they may drop out of the system.
Our regression results on demographic variables are consistent across specifi cations and with our previous analyses. African Americans, Hispanics, and American Indians are all less likely to receive the WFC. Consistent with expectations regarding work skills, household heads without a high school diploma and younger household heads are less likely to receive the WFC. Table 4 shows that these groups are more likely to have covered earnings in the phase-in range of the state earned income credit, have no earnings, or have no record of earnings, earned income credit or welfare receipt. In terms of economic conditions, a good economy, as measured by lower unemployment rates and higher growth in local area aggregate wages, raises receipt rates of all current and former welfare recipients.
Changes in the Probability of Participation
As shown in Table 12 , parents increase their odds of participation by 5 percent in response to a $100 increase in the state earned income credit. We fi nd noticeably fewer statistically signifi cant coeffi cients when examining participation rates but, when signifi cant, the coeffi cients are of the expected sign and, in the case of the WFC, tend to be larger. In general, expansions in the WFC seem correlated with higher participation. 21 When we drop the fi xed effects for years, even though only one coefficient is significant, all estimated coeffi cients for the earned income credit parameters suggest that an expansion in the WFC leads to higher participation percentages. These results also suggest that the yearly dummies may incorporate some changes in the WFC along with other residual effects.
22 This may be particularly true when the state tends to increase more than one parameter at once. However, even though we include year effects for years in which other policy changes are identifi ed, dropping the remainder of year effects may exclude residual changes in policy and in the local economy.
In Table 12 , the estimated coeffi cient for the variable that indicates when parents are on TANF/MFIP suggests that these parents are less likely to receive the earned income credit than former welfare recipients. Table 2 shows that a higher concentration of welfare recipients may be in the phase-in portion of the credit and less likely to participate than eligible households with higher incomes, which might explain the lower participation rates of TANF/MFIP recipients. Roughly 45 percent of all eligible households are within the phase-in range of the credit and would be eligible for TANF/MFIP unless they had no children. Table 3 shows that participation percentages are 55 percent for households in the phase-in range and 70 percent within the phase-out range. As shown in Figure 1 , TANF/MFIP phases out prior to the phase-out range of the WFC.
With regard to out-migration, households are still less likely to participate in the state earned income credit as the number of years since their last spell on welfare increases. Under state law, parents must consider income earned outside the state when claiming the state earned income credit. In addition, parents with residence in another state must fi le a separate tax return, but since we only have access to state resident tax forms, we are not able to examine their WFC participation.
Consistent with the literature on work barriers, African American, Hispanic, and American Indian parents, younger parents, and parents without a high school diploma are less likely to participate in the WFC. Table 4 shows that these parents are more likely to have covered earnings within the phase-in range of the WFC where the benefi t of receiving the WFC may be smaller. In this case, a higher unemployment rate decreases the probability of participation, but lower aggregate wages increase the probability of participation. One potential explanation, subject to further analysis, is that during periods of high wage growth more families may fi nd themselves closer to the phase-out range of the credit and be less likely to participate in the credit program, as demonstrated in Figure 3 .
CONCLUSION
The stories of welfare recipients include successes and challenges in their transitions from welfare to self-sufficiency. Earned income credits provide an incentive to work and researchers have investigated their contribution to helping parents 22 As further evidence of residual effects, one might expect the coeffi cients on our dummy variables for 1998 and 1999 to be positive since these are the years of welfare reform and lower income tax rates. However, we account for the effects of welfare reform and changes in WFC parameters with other variables in our model. Also, the residual effects may be picking up signs of a decrease in employment opportunities for welfare recipients that correspond to a decrease in the percentage of welfare recipients with covered earnings. We further investigate whether alternate specifi cations of the model reverse the signs of these dummy variables with different variable combinations and several linear probability models with household fi xed effects, none of which reverse the sign. In some of these regressions drop the dummy variable for 1998 suggesting severe multicollinearity with other existing variables and further corroboration that it may be picking up all residual changes.
move from welfare to work. However, the use of earned income credits by current and former welfare recipients requires further investigation. We examine state earned income credit utilization by households who currently receive welfare and after their transition from welfare. Two measures provide insight into how many current and former welfare recipients benefi t from state earned income credits. The participation percentage is the percentage of parents who receive the state earned income credit while eligible. The second measure is the receipt percentage, which includes all current and former welfare recipients regardless of whether they have any earnings or earnings inside the range of eligibility. Together, these two measures are relevant for policymakers, identifying areas for improvement such as whether policy might focus on getting the credit to those eligible for the credit, or in getting more parents to become eligible.
Our results suggest that in any single year about 65 percent of welfare recipients eligible for the state earned income credit participate in the program, while 38 percent of all current and former welfare recipients receive the credit. In general, the 65 percent participation rate is lower than the rate found in studies of the entire population of eligible earned income credit recipients, possibly because welfare recipients may have relatively low earnings, qualify for a relatively low credit, and thus have less incentive to claim the credit.
We fi nd that as time passes parents are more likely to receive the credit and get off welfare. Data on transitions depict somewhat chaotic passages between welfare to work. Among those less likely to receive the state earned income credit are non-whites and persons without a high school diploma, which may correspond roughly to parents that face greater barriers to work. An important policy lever available to state policy makers that affects both receipt and participation rates is the generosity of the state earned income credit. In general, policymakers may be able to raise participation and receipt rates for state earned income credits by increasing the generosity of the credit.
